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In 1991, James Rachels, professor of philosophy at the University of 
Alabama, Birmingham from 1977 until his death from cancer in 2003,1 
published Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism.2 
                                                
1 James Rachels (1941-2003) first served as chair of the philosophy department, 
then as dean of arts and humanities. He returned to regular professorship in 1983 and 
continued in that capacity until his death from cancer in 2003. According to the Univer-
sity Radio Station, WBHM, his textbook, The Elements of Moral Philosophy, is about to 
become the most sold ethics textbook in history, currently used as required reading in 
about one-third of all university ethics courses in U. S. colleges and universities. See, 
WBHM, “In Memoriam: James Rachels 1941-2003,” Undated, http://www.wbhm.org/ 
News/2003/rachels.html (18 May 2004). For an obituary of James Rachels copied from 
the Birmingham News, see, “James Rachels, Ph.D. 1941-2003,” 6 September 2003, 
http://www.bradpriddy.com/rachels/obituary.htm (18 May 2004). 
2 James Rachels, Created from Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism 
(New York: Oxford UP, 1991), 1-4. Hereafter cited as CfA. Rachels’ book has a well-
done presentation on the history of the debate between Christians and evolutionists re-
garding the moral implications of Darwinian evolution. See also, C. Leon Harris, Evolu-
tion: Genesis and Revelations (Albany: State U of New York P, 1981), 17-18, who also 
presents a series of fundamentalist assertions regarding the moral implications of evolu-
tion. A more general history is found in Duane McCampbell, “The Development and 
Failure of the Nineteenth-Century Evolutionary Theory of Ethics,” Restoration Quarterly 
26 (1983): 161-71. For a conservative Christian overview of evolutionary ethics, see Ian 
T. Taylor, In the Minds of Men: Darwin and the New World Order (Toronto: TFE, 1984), 
340-430. Taylor credits Darwinism for being the root of today’s teaching of situation 
ethics. He likewise cites a humanist author as declaring that Darwin’s discovery sounded 
the death knell of religious and moral values (421-22). 
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In this work Rachels sets out to demonstrate how Darwinism (or any 
other materialist view of origins) undermines traditional Judeo-Christian 
morality. Rachels sees traditional morality as centered on the protection 
of human rights at the expense of the rest of the natural world. His sig-
nificance is that he seeks to establish the moral implications of Darwin’s 
theory by directly attacking traditional Judeo-Christian ethics and moral-
ity. 
As part of this attack on Christian morality, Rachels identifies two 
ways that Darwinism undermines forms of theism compatible with clas-
sic Judeo-Christian theology. The first way is through the problem of 
natural evil, which I shall only briefly explore in this article. The second 
is to argue that Darwin’s theory centers on the rejection of teleology, i.e. 
design, and that any form of theism based in divine will and design is 
incompatible with Darwinism.3 This article will focus mainly on this 
second issue to see if Rachels’ claims hold true.  
In order to get to the implications of Darwin’s theory for the mission 
if the church, I shall first make a moderately extensive investigation of 
Rachels’ claims concerning the impact of a non-teleological view of God 
on morality and theology. I will do this, in part, by examining views ex-
pounded by the new discipline of evolutionary theology. The reason for 
examining the discipline of evolutionary theology is that its theologians 
do not have the strong bonds of biblical tradition to hinder taking the im-
plications of a theology based on Darwin to its logical conclusions, un-
like many SDA scientists and theologians who have such traditions to 
limit their intellectual explorations. Hence, the evolutionary theologians 
provide evidence independent of our presuppositions regarding the im-
plications of evolution for theology. 
This exploration of moral and theological implications of Darwinism 
is necessary to set up key moral and theological concepts that will be-
come the basis of my exploration of the possible impact of Darwin’s the-
ory on the mission of the church. I will particularly focus on how such 
theological views may impact the mission of the Seventh-day Church. 
                                                
3 Rachels sees the human-preference element of traditional ethics as grounded in 
two principles that he labels the “image of God thesis” and the “rationality thesis.” In the 
first, humans are entitled to special protection since they are the image of God while ani-
mals are not, while the second argues that humans hold a privileged position because they 
have reason and animals do not. Rachels summarizes his work at the end of chapter 4 in 
CfA by stating that chapter 3 is dedicated to showing how Darwinism undermines the 
image-of-God thesis, while chapter 4 is focused on undermining the rationality thesis 
(171).  
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The unifying question for this article, then, is this: Can an interpretation 
of God devoid of design adequately support our current identity and mis-
sion?  
A final observation is in order before embarking on our task. The 
scope of this article means that I cannot expend much effort in rebutting 
the various views of God, the problem of evil, and more, while keeping 
to the focus of my core question. Some footnotes will refer you to other 
work I have done in this area, but overall, the limits of this paper prevent 
me from playing the apologist in these matters. With these matters in 
mind, let us turn to our core question: Can an interpretation of God de-
void of design adequately support our current identity and mission? To 
begin our search for the answer, we must address the question of how 
Darwinism undermines teleology in theology. 
 
Overview of Rachels’ Position 
We shall open our inquiry by examining Rachels’ use of the problem 
of evil to undermine Christian morality and theology. As Rachels notes, 
“The existence of evil has always been a chief obstacle to belief in an all-
good, all-powerful God. How can God and evil co-exist? If God is per-
fectly good, he would not want evil to exist; and if he is all-powerful, he 
is able to eliminate it. Yet evil exists. Therefore, the argument goes, God 
must not exist.”4 Rachels lists five traditional answers offered by theolo-
gians5 and then argues that the excessive amount of evil in the world and 
the distinction between moral and natural evil combine to undermine 
these traditional answers.6 However, he admits that “All these arguments 
are available to reconcile God’s existence with evil. Certainly, then, the 
                                                
4 Ibid., 103. 
5 1. “Perhaps evil is necessary so that we may appreciate the good. . . . 2. Perhaps 
evil is a punishment for man’s sin. Before the fall people lived in Paradise. It was their 
own fault sin that resulted in their expulsion. Therefore, people suffer because they have 
brought it on themselves. 3. Perhaps evil is placed in the world so that, by struggling with 
it, human beings can develop moral character. . . . 4. Perhaps evil is the unavoidable con-
sequence of man’s free will. In order to make us moral agents, rather than mere robots, it 
was necessary for God to endow us with free will. But in making us free agents, God 
enabled us to cause evil, even though he would not cause it himself. 5. Or, if all else fails, 
the theist can always fall back on the idea that our limited human intelligence is insuffi-
cient to comprehend God’s great design. There is a reason for evil; we just aren’t smart 
enough to figure out what it is.” CfA, 104.  
6 Ibid., 104-105. 
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simple version of the argument from evil does not force the theist to 
abandon belief.”7 
In reference to the theism issue, Rachels asserts that Darwin’s theory 
would expect natural evil, suffering and unhappiness to be widespread as 
it is, while the divine hypothesis view would not. “Thus,” asserts Ra-
chels, “Darwin believed, natural selection accounts for the facts regard-
ing happiness and unhappiness in the world, whereas the rival hypothesis 
of divine creation did not.”8  
This last point is especially crucial for Rachels. He notes that Darwin 
sought an account of origins and life that most easily fits the facts of suf-
fering with the least amount of explanatory contortions. On this account, 
Rachels claims that “Divine creation is a poor hypothesis because it fits 
the facts badly.”9 In the mean time, the current patterns of suffering are 
said to be just what Darwin and his theory would expect with natural se-
lection in process. Rachels thus argues that the biblical doctrine of crea-
tion is less parsimonious than Darwinian evolution, particularly in ex-
                                                
7 Ibid. Emphasis in original. 
8 Ibid. For a fuller exploration of the problem of evil and Christian responses to it, 
see Stephen Bauer, “Moral Implications of Darwinian Evolution for Human Preference 
Based in Christian Ethics: A Critical Analysis and Response to the “Moral Individual-
ism” of James Rachels” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Andrews University, 2006), 243-266. A 
couple of interesting arguments I examine include Casserly’s argument concerning the 
problem of good: If our world is merely a system of natural cause and effect, where did 
all the good in this world come from? A purely atheistical viewpoint should not expect 
such levels of good. He concludes that the problem of evil for the theist is not nearly as 
vexing as the problem of good is for the atheist (J. V. Langmead Casserley, Evil and 
Evolutionary Eschatology: Two Essays, ed. C. Don Keys. Toronto Studies in Theology, 
vol. 39. [Lewiston: Edwin Mellen, 1990], 11; Idem, Man’s Pain and God’s Goodness 
[London: Mowbray, 1951], 38-39). See also, C. S. Lewis, who makes a similar argument, 
quipping, “It is mere nonsense to put pain among the discoveries of science. Lay down 
this book and reflect for five minutes on the fact that all the great religions were first 
preached, and long practiced, in a world without chloroform” (The Problem of Pain: How 
Human Suffering Raises Almost Intolerable Intellectual Problems [New York: Macmillan 
Co., 1962], 15). 
Additionally, it seems that most who challenge Christianity with the problem of evil 
seem to have an overly optimistic view of human abilities in wisdom and knowledge. 
Hence, if we cannot understand why God permits something, there must be no good rea-
son. The assumption is biblically fallacious, denying our limits and indicting God based 
on a hubris devoid of humble recognition of those limits. 
9 Ibid., 106. 
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plaining the presence of natural evil.10 Since Darwin has, in Rachels’ 
view, presented an alternative to divine creation that is viable and exhib-
its greater parsimony, the divine creation hypothesis is now undermined 
by good reasons. Feeling he has established this point, Rachels now turns 
to the issue of teleology. 
 
Teleology: The Central Issue 
Rachels credits Marx with pinpointing the “philosophical nerve” of 
Darwin’s theory. According to Rachels, Marx declared the theory of evo-
lution to be “the death blow . . . to ‘Teleology’ in the natural sciences.”11 
Thus, it may be that the most significant aspect of Darwin’s theory is his 
overall rejection of teleology in nature. Rachels reminds us that “a teleo-
logical explanation is an explanation of something in terms of its func-
tion and purpose: the heart is for pumping blood, the lungs are for breath-
ing, and so on.”12 Teleology thus implies a purpose or design, which 
must have been determined by the intentions of a maker. But there can be 
no designer in Darwinian evolution, and as Rachels notes, “If there is no 
maker—if the object in question is not an artifact—does it make sense to 
speak of a ‘purpose’?” The answer is, “No,” says Rachels. Any purposes 
attributed are merely those we assign. Thus, “the connection between 
function and conscious intention is, in Darwin’s theory, completely sev-
ered.13  
Rachels has thus highlighted the debate over the design argument 
(offered by Paley), which is considered by many to be definitively re-
futed by Hume.14 The problem is, notes Rachels, that Hume and other 
critics of the design argument only pointed out logical deficiencies in the 
design argument, but “they could not supply a better way of understand-
ing the apparent design of nature. . . . Darwin did what Hume could not 
do: he provided an alternative, giving people something else they could 
                                                
10 Tom Regan places much emphasis on the principle of parsimony or simplicity in 
his argumentation, including some discussion and description of the principle. See The 
Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: U of California P, 1983), 21-24. 
11 Rachels, CfA, 110-111. 
12 Ibid. Rachels admits, “It is an exaggeration to say that Darwin dealt teleology a 
death blow; even after Darwin we still find biologists offering teleological explanations. 
But now they are offered in a different spirit. Biological function is no longer compared 
to the function of consciously designed artifacts” (112).  
13 Ibid., 111-112. 
14 Ibid., 118. 
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believe. Only then was the design hypothesis dead.”15 For Rachels, then, 
it is the fact that Darwin’s theory provided a rational alternative to tele-
ology that makes Darwin’s theory so capable of undermining any form 
of theism necessary to sustain traditional Christian morality. 
The issue here, however, is not the efficacy of the design versus ma-
terialism argument. It is, rather, that to accept Darwin’s theory is to ac-
cept that there is no purpose or design in nature at all. This completely 
opposes classic Judeo-Christian theism, in which there is a cosmic design 
and purpose, often articulated by Adventists in terms of the Great Con-
troversy motif. Rachels asks his clinching question: “Can theism be sepa-
rated from belief in design? It would be a heroic step, because the design 
hypothesis is not an insignificant component of traditional religious be-
lief. But it can be done, and in fact it has been done, by eighteenth-
century deists.”16  
Deism, he notes, rejects any personal-relational view of God, replac-
ing that with a God who created natural laws, made the world, and now 
lets it run itself by those natural laws. The God of deism is hands-off and 
not concerned with details. Thus, there is theism without teleological 
design.17 What is the significance of this for Rachels? Rachels declares, 
“Since deism is a consistent theistic view, it is tempting simply to con-
clude that theism and Darwinism must be compatible, and to say no 
more. But the temptation should be resisted, at least until we have made 
clear what has been given up in the retreat to deism.”18 In the words of 
Sigmund Freud, the God of the deists is “nothing but an insubstantial 
shadow and no longer the mighty personality of religious doctrine.”19 All 
                                                
15 Ibid., 120. Emphasis in original. 
16 Rachels, CfA, 125. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. Emphasis mine. 
19 Sigmund Freud, The Future of an Illusion, trans. W. D. Robson-Scott (New York: 
Liveright, 1928), 57. Of further interest is that between pp. 25 and 35, Freud argues that 
deities are human inventions to personalize the forces of nature so that man can feel he 
has a relationship with these forces that will enable man to manipulate nature or at least 
be protected from it. Thus, Freud casts human culture as a tool to aid the dynamic of man 
versus nature. This clearly depicts a culture where man is viewed as special apart from 
nature and juxtaposed against it. In relation to Rachels’ use of the quotation in the text 
above, it is significant that Freud asserts, “And the more autonomous nature becomes and 
the more the gods withdraw from her, the more earnestly are all expectations concen-
trated on the third task assigned to them” (p. 31, emphasis mine). Freud astutely connects 
autonomy of nature to a withdrawal from divine dominance, thus underscoring Rachels’ 
assertion that deism is too anemic a theism to support traditional morality.  
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that is left is the concept of God as the original cause. But, says Rachels, 
Darwin has asserted that to say the original cause is God is merest specu-
lation. It can be asserted but no good reasons can be given to substantiate 
it. And, in fact, Rachels asserts that if we can accept that God is un-
caused, then there is no good reason to reject the assertion that the uni-
verse is uncaused.20 Thus, for Rachels, Darwinism clearly undermines 
biblical theism so severely that, in Rachels’ words, “the atheistical con-
clusion can be resisted, but only at great cost.”21 For Rachels, the cost is 
severe enough that he asserts that a theism compatible with Darwin’s 
theory is too weak to support traditional Christian morality.  
 
Darwinian Theism 
Introduction. Rachels has asserted that if theism is maintained with 
belief in Darwinism, then the type of theism permitted cannot support 
traditional ethics, especially in the matter of human preference. But how 
efficacious is this claim?  
There are two issues imbedded in Rachels’ conclusion. First, all the 
argumentation concerning God, from Darwin to Rachels, presupposes a 
particular doctrine of God. What doctrine of God is thus depicted? Sec-
ond, are there any theologians who have attempted to build a theological 
view of God based on the principles of Darwinism? If so, what are some 
of the implications for the Seventh-day Adventist Church and its mis-
sion? 
Darwin’s God. Plantinga offers us an initial answer to the first ques-
tion. He notes that the only arguments for incompatibility between God 
and evolution “have turned from deductive to probabilistic arguments 
from evil.” Thus, “the typical atheological claim at present is not that the 
existence of God is incompatible with that of evil, but rather, that the 
latter offers the resources for a strong probabilistic argument against the 
former.”22 However, the probabilistic argument (a type of parsimony as-
sertion) itself assumes a particular doctrine of God. This issue is superbly 
developed by Cornelius Hunter. 
Hunter cites numerous claims by evolutionists, giving various rea-
sons why “God would not have created [the present natural order] in this 
way.”23 He calls this approach “negative theology” because it is offering 
                                                
20 Rachels, CfA, 108, 126. 
21 Ibid., 127, 126. 
22 Plantinga, 71. 
23 In many parts of this book Hunter quotes or cites an evolutionist making such a 
claim. For examples see, Hunter, 12-13, 44-49, 63-64, 81-84, 98-99, 109-110. 
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proof by negative instead of positive evidence.24 But in so doing, argues 
Hunter, “they are beholden to a specific notion of God, and notions of 
God, no matter how carefully considered, are outside the realm of sci-
ence.”25 Thus, a major assumption of the evolutionary position is not sci-
entific at all! And this point is foundational to why Hunter calls Darwin’s 
theory the “evolution theodicy.”26 But why does Hunter see Darwin as so 
theological? 
Hunter argues that a seminal influence on Darwin was Milton’s 
Parasise Lost. In Hunter’s view, Milton was addressing the problem of 
evil, and solved it by distancing God from the creation. “Both men were 
dealing with the problem of evil—Milton with moral evil and Darwin 
with natural evil—and both found solutions by distancing God from evil. 
And most important, the two held similar conceptions of God.”27 How-
ever,  
 
Darwin’s solution distanced God from creation to the point 
that God was unnecessary. One could still believe in God, but 
not in God’s providence. Separating God from creation and its 
evils meant that God could have no direct influence or control 
over the world. God may have created the world, but ever 
since that point it has run according to impersonal natural laws 
that may now and then produce natural evil.28  
 
Therefore, “Darwin was now increasing this separation to the point that 
the link between creation and God was severed.”29 According to Hunter, 
the result is that “God, on the one hand, is seen as all-good but not neces-
sarily all-powerful, or at least does not exercise all his power. God is vir-
tuous, not dictatorial.”30 But notice, then, that elimination of God is no 
longer necessary. “The end result of Darwin’s theory is not that there is 
                                                
24 Ibid., 47-48. See also 97, 103. 
25 Ibid., 92. 
26 Ibid., 13. Hunter frequently calls evolution a theodicy and, on 173-175, closes the 
book on this theme.  
27 Ibid., 12. 
28 Ibid., 16. 
29 Ibid., 17. Mattill makes an observation similar to Hunter’s by asserting that when 
Darwin proposed natural selection as the creative force, “Darwin rewrote Genesis and 
transferred God’s workload to the process of evolution, even as Newton had transferred 
another part of the divine workload to gravity. Biology and astronomy were dislodging 
God from governing the world.” A. J. Mattill, Jr., The Seven Mighty Blows to Traditional 
Beliefs (Gordo: Flatwoods Free, 1995), 26. Emphasis mine. 
30 Ibid., 146. 
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no God, but rather, that God is disjoint from the material world. . . . In 
evolution theodicy, the Creator must be disjoint from creation, but no 
more than this is required.”31 Thus, Hunter disagrees with Rachels that 
Darwinism makes atheism difficult to resist, but agrees that the theory of 
evolution does entail a view of God not compatible with traditional 
Christian theism. Is Hunter on the right track in arguing that Darwinism 
offers deliverance from the problem of evil through a reinterpretation of 
God that saves God’s goodness by limiting his power?  
 
A Theology of Evolution 
Introduction. From the late twentieth century until the present, we 
find movement in the direction of promoting such a theology. First, 
authors such as Michael Ruse and Kenneth Miller deny that Darwinism 
is incompatible with belief in God.32 Both seem to leave the door open 
for a variety of theological options. But how wide is a wide array of op-
tions? Ruse recognizes that for those who read Genesis literally, “the 
Darwinian reading of Genesis is going to give you major problems—
insoluble problems, I suspect.”33 Thus, the portal to religious Darwinism 
may not be as wide as is touted. Not all may enter, though some have, 
and the results are fascinating.  
Putting Darwin into Theology. John F. Haught, possibly the lead-
ing scholar in the recently formed movement of evolutionary theology, 
laments that it is not just the discipline of theology that has failed to 
grapple with the implications of Darwin’s theory; neither have the phi-
losophers. “If theology has fallen short of the reality of evolution, how-
ever, so also has the world of thought in general. . . . Philosophy also has 
yet to produce an understanding of reality—an ontology—adequate of 
evolution.”34 Thus he charges that, “to a great extent, theologians still 
think and write almost as if Darwin had never lived.”35  
                                                
31 Ibid., 165. 
32 Ruse, Can a Darwinian Be a Christian?: The Relationship between Science and 
Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004), 138, 216, 217; Kenneth R. Miller, Finding 
Darwin’s God: A Scientist’s Search for Common Ground Between God and Evolution 
(New York: HarperCollins, 1999), xii. 
33 Ruse, 217.  
34 John F. Haught, God After Darwin: A Theology of Evolution (Boulder: Westview, 
2000), 1. 
35 Ibid., 2. One might be tempted to think that Haught has forgotten the work of 
Teilhard de Chardin in combining theology with Darwinian evolution, but Haught assures 
us otherwise. “Although Teilhard himself was a profoundly religious thinker, he was not 
a professional theologian, and so his own efforts to construe a ‘God for evolution’ 
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Haught responds to this problem by proposing the possibilities of a 
theology informed by evolution. 
 
I shall argue in the pages ahead that Darwin has gifted us with 
an account of life whose depth, beauty, and pathos—when 
seen in the context of the larger cosmic epic of evolution—
expose[s] us afresh to the raw reality of the sacred and to a re-
soundingly meaningful universe. 36  
 
Haught expresses high hopes about the prospects of a Darwinian 
theology: “I cannot here emphasize enough, therefore, the gift evolution 
can be to our theology. For us to turn our backs on it, as so many Chris-
tians continue to do, is to lose a great opportunity to deepen our under-
standing of the wisdom and self-effacing love of God.”37  
But what would such a theology be like? First it is not the same as 
natural theology. Haught declares: “Evolutionary theology, unlike natu-
ral theology, does not search for definitive footprints of the divine in na-
ture. . . . Instead of trying to prove God’s existence from nature, evolu-
tionary theology seeks to show how our new awareness of cosmic and 
biological evolution can enhance and enrich traditional teachings about 
God and God’s way of acting in the world.”38 Diarmuid O’Murchu fur-
ther asserts that: “Evolutionary theology wishes to keep open the possi-
bility that all forms of creaturehood (plant and animal alike) are dimen-
sions of divine disclosure and can enlighten us in our desire to under-
stand God more deeply and respond in faith more fully. Evolutionary 
theology is committed to a radically open-ended understanding of how 
the divine reveals itself in and to the world.”39 This means that in evolu-
tionary theology, nature is not used as evidence to prove classical attrib-
utes of God. Rather, both Darwinian evolution and God’s creatorship are 
assumed to be true. Thus, evolution shows us how God created, and this 
method of creating, in turn, deepens our understanding of who God is 
and how He operates. However, Haught cautions, “trying to locate God’s 
                                                                                                         
stopped short of the systematic development his intuitions demanded.” See, John F. 
Haught, Deeper than Darwin: The Prospect for Religion in the Age of Evolution (Boul-
der: Westview, 2003), 162. 
36 Haught, God After Darwin, 2. 
37 John F. Haught, Responses to 101 Questions on God and Evolution (New York: 
Paulist, 2001), 114. 
38 Haught, God After Darwin, 36. 
39 Diarmuid O’Murchu, Evolutionary Faith: Rediscovering God in Our Great Story 
(Maryknoll: Orbis, 2002), 88. 
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activity within or at the level of natural biological causation really 
amounts to a shrinkage of God. This approach is known as ‘god-of-the-
gaps’ theology. . . . A god-of-the-gaps approach is a science stopper. . . . 
But, even worse, it is theologically idolatrous. It makes divine action one 
link in the world’s chain of finite causes rather than the ultimate ground 
of all natural causes.”40  
This, in turn, means that we cannot ascribe specific activity to God, 
just as Rachels predicted. The result, as O’Murchu notes, is that “evolu-
tionary theology borrows liberally from process thought.”41 O’Murchu 
further asserts that “the process position challenges the assumption that 
our God must always be a ruling, governing power above and beyond 
God’s own creation.”42 Why is the tendency to favor process theology 
significant? O’Murchu explains, “What conventional believers find un-
acceptable about the process position is the notion of a vulnerable God, 
allegedly at the mercy of capricious forces as are all other creatures of 
the universe.”43 Thus, the first significant theological impact of Darwin 
that we shall examine is the limiting of God’s power in order to save His 
goodness. 
Limiting God’s Power to Save His Goodness. The limiting of di-
vine power is one of the early issues that Haught examines in his book, 
God After Darwin. Early in the book, Haught examines David Hull’s 
argument that the present order is incompatible with the concept of God. 
Hull asks, “What kind of God can one infer from the sort of phenomenon 
epitomized by the species on Darwin’s Galapagos Islands?” He eventu-
ally answers, “The God of the Galapagos is careless, wasteful, indiffer-
ent, almost diabolical. This is not the sort of God to whom anyone would 
be inclined to pray.”44 But would this not impeach the goodness of God, 
as Hull has charged? 
A number of theologians and philosophers would answer this ques-
tion, “No.” They argue that natural evil is unavoidable for God because 
His power is limited. Bertocci argues that “the evidence indicates God is 
not omnipotent,” and goes on to argue that only by having limited power 
                                                
40 Haught, 101 Questions, 18-19. 
41 Ibid., 79. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 David L. Hull, “The God of the Galapagos,” Nature 352 (August 8, 1991): 486. 
The last lines are quoted in Haught, God After Darwin, 6.  
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can God’s moral goodness be preserved.45 C. Don Keyes states that 
through the work of Julian Casserley, he has come to the conclusion that  
 
God ought not to be defined primarily in terms of sovereignty 
and power. The implications of this statement liberated me 
from interpreting God’s omnipotence as the kind of coercive 
power capable of always preventing evil. Instead, I now firmly 
believe with Plato that the goodness of God is his most essen-
tial quality and that he is the author only of the good things 
that happen. Ultimately ‘power’ and ‘good’ are different kinds 
of reality, but of the two, good is more absolutely attributable 
to God. The power of the good is almost always indirect. 46 
 
Keys gives no good reasons for ascribing goodness as an absolute 
quality while treating omnipotence as a symbolic or relative quality, 
other than the ability to explain evil, and possibly the support of Plato. It 
is also significant, as we shall soon see, that goodness becomes the su-
preme, untouchable attribute of God to which all other attributes, includ-
ing power, seem to be subjugated. 
Korsmeyer echoes the refrain in which God’s power is limited in or-
der to preserve his goodness.  
 
The painfully slow evolution of life, spreading in great diver-
sity into all available niches, trying out all possible avenues of 
advance, the huge role of chance, the stumbling advances to 
greater complexity, all these things suggest a divine nature at 
                                                
45 Bertocci, 413-414. Emphasis in original. See also 466-467, where he repeats his 
argument that limited power is the only way to maintain God’s moral goodness. 
46 C. Don Keys, “Julian Casserley’s Hope,” in Evil and Evolutionary Eschatology: 
Two Essays, xxii-xxiii. Casserley actually says little about God’s power, but what he says 
seems to agree with Keys’s reaction to his work. In this quote, Casserley is combating a 
form of humanism he perceives to focus on developing human power but not human 
morality: 
“Strangely enough, most of those humanists who seem drawn towards a humanism 
of power are precisely the people who are most apt to react against a conception of God 
as kind of a celestial policeman wielding absolute powers over men. For myself, I not 
only object to a conception of God that thinks of him merely, or even primarily in terms 
of sovereignty and power, but I object also to any conception of man that thinks of him 
merely or even primarily in terms of sovereignty or power, and I object to both doctrines 
for the same reason, that they misapprehend the true value and excellence of personality 
[i.e., character]. The person, whether divine or human, finds authentic self-expression in 
the range and integrity of his loving and in the wide variety of his values. A humanism of 
power is as objectionable as the Calvinistic-type of theism and for precisely the same 
reasons.” Casserley, Evil, 27. Emphases mine.  
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odds with the omnipotent God of classical theism. The uni-
verse, as we know it, was not created in an instant of absolute 
coercive power. . . . The universe’s story is suggesting that di-
vine power is different from what we have imagined. It is like 
the power of love, persuasive, patient, and persistent. . . .47 
 
All of these authors speak as if their position on limiting God’s power is 
so self-evident that there can be no criticism of it. 
Kraemer offers three rebuttals to the limited power view of God. 
First, is God only limited in power as claimed? If He is limited in power, 
why not in knowledge and goodness as well? Why limit God’s power 
only? Second, he picks up Hume’s argument that if God were this lim-
ited in power, He should have created fewer animals with better faculties 
for happiness. Third, Kramer questions if such a limited, imprudent God 
is worthy of respect and worship. He reminds us that “other great but 
limited beings, saints and heroes, clearly merit respect, but not worship. 
Once God is similarly limited, the problem of justifying the worship-
worthiness of God needs to be addressed.”48 
The Hidden, Humble God of Evolution. Haught proposes that his 
non-omnipotent view of God depicts Him as actually being more deeply 
involved in the world than a deity who controls things by external power. 
This depth of involvement is based on a panentheistic doctrine of God. 
Thus, His work is “interior to the process of creation.”49 But why should 
we believe such a God inhabits nature? Is there any evidence for this 
conclusion?  
Ironically, the answer is no. Three times in as many pages, Haught 
asserts that the concept of divine humility better explains the evolution-
ary data than does traditional theology or materialism.50 In another work, 
he argues that “nothing less than a transcendent force, radically distinct 
from, but also intimately incarnate in matter could ultimately explain 
evolution.”51 Haught describes this immanent presence as God’s “self-
withdrawal,” “self-absenting,” and “self-concealment,” so as to not have 
any external influence or exercise of “coercive power” over the uni-
verse.52 “God is present in the mode of ‘hiddenness.’”53 Twice more he 
                                                
47 Korsmeyer, 84. Emphases mine. 
48 Kraemer, 11. 
49 Haught, 101 Questions, 119.  
50 Haught, God After Darwin, 53-55.  
51 Haught, Deeper than Darwin, 163 
52 Haught, God After Darwin, 195, 197, 203.  
53 Ibid., 195.  
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asserts that God is present in the form of “ultimate goodness.”54 Thus, 
Haught associates the limited power of God, represented by His hidden-
ness, as being ultimate goodness.  
It seems ironic, with Haught’s dedication to modern science, that he 
claims this hidden God can only be detected by faith. Says Haught, “The 
world is embraced constantly by God’s presence. But this presence does 
not show up as an object to be grasped by ordinary awareness or scien-
tific method. It is empirically unavailable, in other words. . . . Only those 
attuned to religious experience will be aware or appreciative of it.”55 This 
is amazing! Haught is appealing to subjective experience for a major pil-
lar of his theology. And he makes the appeal more than once: “The raw 
ingredients of evolution flow forth from the depths of divine love, a 
depth that will show up only to those whose personal lives have already 
been grasped by a sense of God.”56 A few phrases later he reiterates,  
 
The very fact that nature can lend itself to a literalist reading is 
a consequence of the humble, hidden and vulnerable way in 
which divine love works. The very possibility of giving an 
atheistic interpretation of evolution is that God’s creative love 
humbly refuses to make itself available at the level of scien-
tific comprehension.57  
 
Haught further claims to base this subjective discovery of God in na-
ture from Tillich’s concept of God as infinite depth, which is self authen-
ticating.58 
The panentheistic hiddenness of God has been argued by Haught to 
be an expression of divine humility to protect the absolute freedom of the 
universe. This concept of divine humility is significant, for Haught treats 
it as a metaphysics for grounding his theology.  
The theological basis of this metaphysics of divine hiddenness and 
humility is the kenosis passage of Phil 2. For Haught, the kenosis, espe-
cially as seen in the crucifixion, is the primary method by which God 
                                                
54 Ibid., 197, 203.  
55 Haught, 101 Questions, 119. 
56 Ibid., 60-61. Emphasis mine. 
57 Ibid., 61.  
58 Haught, Deeper than Darwin, 27-29. Haught also appeals non-Christian sources 
for this view of God as well: Indian, Taoist, Buddhist, and Platonic beliefs are all based 
on the concept of a hidden, deeper reality than the visible world. He further asserts that 
Christ espoused a similar concept by declaring that God’s Kingdom is within us (29-30). 
See also O’Murchu, 34, 88, 90, where he makes the same argument as Haught. 
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relates to creation, from and throughout eternity. God hid himself 
through the incarnation in the humble servant-form of the man, Jesus 
Christ. Thus, for Haught, “It is to this image that Christian theology must 
always repair whenever it thinks about God’s relationship to the world 
and its evolution.”59  
The application of this metaphysical principle leads to an openly es-
poused panentheism advocated through the concept of a divine incarna-
tion with the material universe. For example, Haught describes his God 
of evolution as “a promising God already incarnate in matter.”60 Com-
menting on the saying of Jesus, “if I be lifted up from the earth, will 
draw all [men] unto me,”61 Haught offers an alternative model of incar-
nation, declaring, “This image suggests that the most glorious form of 
power is that which humbly invites other beings to enter into organic 
unity with God of their own accord, and not out of compulsion.”62  
Love’s Power Is Non-Coercive. For evolutionary theology, a key 
implication of this panentheism is that a truly loving God must be non-
coercive. Haught makes this fundamental connection by stating: 
 
The doctrine of grace proclaims that God loves the world and 
all of its various elements fully and unconditionally. By defini-
tion, however, love does not absorb, annihilate, or force itself 
upon the beloved. Instead it longs for the beloved to become 
more and more ‘other’ or differentiated. . . . To compel, after 
all would be contrary to the very nature of love.63  
 
Miller argues in a similar fashion that the divine love is not a control-
ling power in the universe. “A world without meaning would be one in 
which a Deity pulled the string of every human puppet, and every mate-
rial particle as well. . . . By being always in control, the Creator would 
deny His creatures any real opportunity to know and worship Him. 
Authentic love requires freedom, not manipulation.”64 
Haught uses emotive and almost pejorative language to describe the 
traditional view of God in contrast to his humble, vulnerable God.  
 
                                                
59 Ibid., 111. Emphasis mine. 
60 Haught, 101 Questions, 115.  
61 John 12:32, KJV. 
62 Haught, 101 Questions, 117. Emphasis mine. 
63 Haught, God After Darwin, 39-41. Emphasis mine. Haught repeats these types of 
arguments on pp. 112-114. 
64 Ibid., 289. Emphasis mine. 
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The God of Jesus is utterly unlike . . . our traditional images of 
God understood as divine potentate or ‘designer.’ Theology is of-
fended by evolution only when it assumes a rather imperious concept 
of divine omnipotence. . . . 
Evolutionary science, however, demands that we give up once 
and for all the tyrannical images we may have sometimes projected 
onto God. 65 
 
By contrast, evolution invites us to “recapture the often obscured portrait 
of a self-humbling, suffering God who is anything but a divine controller 
or designer of the cosmos.”66 The evolutionary God “refrains from wield-
ing the domineering power that both skeptics and believers often project 
onto their ideal of the absolute.” Yet God is not “a weak or powerless 
God incapable of redeeming this flawed universe, but one whose salvific 
and creative effectiveness is all the more prevailing because it is rooted 
in a divine humility.”67 Thus Haught asserts that, “in the final analysis, 
persuasive power is more influential, more ‘powerful’, than coercion.”68  
This rejection of any kind of hands-on rulership and intervention by 
God has some important implications for soteriology and eschatology. 
Korsmeyer expresses the ultimate destiny of the world in terms of 
apotheosis.  
 
The divine life is constantly receiving the lives of everyone in 
the world, and adding each moment to the collected moments 
of their past. All these moments are experienced by God with 
no loss of intensity or immediacy. The past of the world enters 
the everlasting present of the divine immediacy. The world is 
                                                
65 Haught, 101 Questions, 127. Emphasis mine. 
66 Ibid., Deeper than Darwin, 81. 
67 Ibid., 82. See also, Korsmeyer, 94, 96. In arguing for a power-sharing God, 
Korsmeyer sounds not unlike Mill. Mill argues that the problem of evil makes us worship 
a contradictory god, for “the ways of this Deity in Nature are on many occasions totally 
at variance with the precepts, as he believes, of the same Deity in the Gospel.” The only 
non-contradictory view of Deity for Mill is one that posits two competing principles or 
powers, one good and one evil. But this seems, for Mill, to diminish the good god’s 
power, for, “a virtuous human assumes in this theory the exalted character of a fellow-
laborer with the Highest, a fellow combatant in the great strife; contributing his little, 
which by the aggregation of many like himself becomes much, towards that progressive 
ascendency, and ultimately complete triumph of good over evil, . . . as planned by the 
Being to whom we owe all the benevolent contrivance we behold in nature.” Mill, 113, 
116-117.  
68 Ibid., 138.  
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transformed in God, who weaves everything that is worth-
while into greater harmony, a greater whole.69  
 
For Korsmeyer,  
 
Perhaps we have been called into existence to assist the great 
divine evolutionary plan to move the whole universe toward 
divinity, to be co-workers, co-creators in bringing about the 
Kingdom of God among us. Perhaps eschatology has to be re-
thought.70  
 
Evolution, Soteriology, and Eschatology. Korsmeyer asserts that 
“the idea of God bringing the universe to an end in the near future 
through Christ’s second coming is not compatible with the evidence of 
the divine efforts in the universe for fifteen billion years.”71 O’Murchu 
likewise affirms, “I no longer believe in the anthropocentric myth of the 
end of the world. There is every likelihood that we humans will destroy 
ourselves, but not creation. Creation has an infinite capacity to cocre-
ate.”72 Haught likewise denies, based on an evolutionary perspective of 
our world’s history, that there was an original, perfect world that lost its 
perfection and will once again be restored. “Thus, a scientifically in-
formed understanding of redemption may no longer plausibly make 
themes of restoration or recovery dominant. . . . It would be absurd, 
therefore, to seek the restoration of a chronologically primordial state of 
material dispersal.”73 Not only does evolutionary theology overturn our 
concept of God, but it also seems unable to support the hope of a re-
stored, sinless perfect world. The second coming of Christ disappears 
                                                
69 Korsmeyer, 102. Emphasis mine. 
70 Ibid., 88. In saying God has an evolutionary plan, Korsmeyer may be treading on 
dangerous ground. In the 1980s, one Protestant denomination combined the concepts of 
an evolutionary view of origins with the biblical doctrine of human dominion over nature 
to concoct a Christianized form of Julian Huxley’s Moral Darwinism, where man takes 
over the supervision of his own evolution. This included advocacy of eugenics and abor-
tion as tools for managing our evolution. For more information see, Stephen Bauer, 
“Genesis, Dominion, and Ethics: A Critical Analysis of Ethics Based on the Concept of 
Dominion in Genesis 1:26-28,” Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 6, no. 2 
(1995): 77-108.  
71 Korsmeyer, 88. 
72 O’Murchu, 4. 
73 Haught, Deeper than Darwin, 170. 
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from the theological radar screen.74 And it is in the context of this con-
cept of eschatology that our evolutionary theologians see fit to raise the 
issue of human preference. 
For Haught, “It would be callous indeed on the part of theologians to 
perpetuate the one-sidedly anthropocentric and retributive notions of 
pain and redemption that used to fit so comfortably into pre-evolutionary 
pictures of the world.”75 Korsmeyer holds a similar position:  
 
Any ‘exclusive’ theology, which in effect suggests that God is 
only concerned with one group of people on one planet of one 
small star, is not credible. It is the product of a theology that 
considers Scripture in a literalist manner, convinced it pro-
vides a comprehensive scientific worldview, and has not con-
sidered the scientific evidence of who we are, where we are, 
and how we got here.76  
 
Evolutionary theology clearly has catastrophic implications for bibli-
cal eschatology. But this would seem to be the logical outcome of rein-
terpreting God without teleology (design). If God does not relate to the 
material universe through designs and purposes, the key elements of the 
biblical views of the plan of salvation, end-time judgment, and eschatol-
ogy all crumble with the loss of teleology. A non-coercive, evolving God 
of limited power who is found in panentheistic hiddenness, a ground of 
being instead of a personal being, is what is offered instead. Rachels 
seems fundamentally correct in asserting that traditional Christian moral-
ity and theology cannot survive the implications of Darwin’s theory.  
These implications, especially the theological ones, have a direct 
bearing on the biblical mission of the church. It has taken a moderately 
extensive excursus to identify those implications. We are now in a posi-
tion to evaluate how belief in evolution would impact the Adventist iden-




                                                
74 Even without doing evolutionary theology, Darwin’s theory has historically 
shown a penchant for undermining the biblical doctrine of the second coming. One good 
example is, Zachary Hayes, What Are They Saying about the End of the World? (New 
York: Paulist, 1983), 40-46. Hayes cites a number of scholars holding to this denial. Of 
significance is that Hayes explicitly ties denial of the parousia to evolution. 
75 Haught, Deeper than Darwin, 169. Last emphasis mine. 
76 Korsmeyer, 89. 
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Implications for the Mission and Identity of the Adventist Church 
Rachels alluded to the Ten Commandments as part of the biblical 
picture of God’s regard for man. But if Darwinism is accepted as factual, 
then the lack of teleology means there can be no divine design for moral-
ity, just as there was none for creation. Why would God avoid design in 
creation only to have design in morals? The designless theism that Ra-
chels rightly demands of Darwinism would have to eliminate the Ten 
Commandments and all other direct moral guidance by God, as shown in 
the Bible. In such a scenario sin is eliminated since there can be no di-
vine law or design to violate.77 Thus, Darwinism clearly undermines the 
foundations of biblical morality, yet our identity as Adventists lies heav-
ily in the imperative to call people to obedience to God’s command-
ments. How can we do so if our scientific paradigms eliminate the verac-
ity of the Ten Commandments? It seems likely that Darwinism is quite 
toxic to this dimension of our mission as a church. 
The elimination of the Ten Commandments (since there is no more 
divine design) means one would eliminate the ability to sin, since there is 
no design to rebel against. Furthermore, judgment becomes impossible 
since there can be no moral design as a standard to which one can be 
held accountable. For Seventh-day Adventist theology, this is especially 
devastating due to the great emphasis on the “investigative judgment.” 
Such a judgment is incompatible with Darwinism or deism, leaving man 
with no real accountability to God. Neither Deism nor Darwinism can 
sustain such a doctrine. Our mission of announcing the judgment and 
calling people to acknowledge their accountability to God is incompati-
ble with the implications of Darwin’s theory. 
This undermining of the doctrines of sin and judgment, in turn, re-
moves the need for salvation from sin and its penalty, for there can be no 
sin or penalty without divine design and sovereignty. This would mean, 
therefore, that there would be no need for an incarnation and sacrificial 
death by Christ. Furthermore, the incarnation event was a designed, 
planned, unnatural act incompatible with Darwinism or a deistic god who 
uses no design. Removing teleology thus undermines several key pillars 
of Christian faith that are crucial to the salvific mission of the church.  
Additionally, if there is no divine design, how can such a theism 
have any meaningful eschatology? If suffering and death are tools of 
evolutionary progress, then death and suffering are natural. Death is no 
                                                
77 Rom 4:15; 5:13; 7:7. Paul here argues that sin is not reckoned where there is no 
law and that he would not know what sin is except for the law. 
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longer an enemy as the Scriptures declare (for example, 1 Cor 15:26). If 
Darwin is right, then why should we hope for a world to come in which 
death and suffering will be no more (Rev 21-22)? Man’s importance in 
the plan of salvation and divine future is replaced by an uncertain future 
of natural selection, personal insignificance, and death. There can be no 
special destiny since there is no divine design that calls for it.  
 
Conclusion  
There is much more that could be done to explore the implications of 
Darwin’s theory for the mission of the Seventh-day Adventist Church. 
Our core identity has been forged in the Great Controversy motif in 
which there is a battle of rival governing powers—something impossible 
if there is no teleology. Our mission is to prepare people to give account 
of themselves to a sovereign, yet loving, almighty moral governor and to 
prepare them for the eschatological restoration of all things which begins 
at the second coming of Christ in glory. It seems clear that the expulsion 
of teleology required by Darwinism will be catastrophic to the mission 
praxis of the Adventist church.  
To attempt to mix Scripture with Materialism is to mix teleology 
with anti-teleology. This may appear to be successfully performed for a 
season because the pioneers of such a shift usually cling to enough tradi-
tion that they are unable, or unwilling, to pursue the new interpretation to 
its logical conclusions. Haught and his cohorts have no such tradition to 
restrain them. Thus, they are free to pursue the full implications of Dar-
win for theology. The Adventist church cannot maintain its mission and 
current identity while affirming Materialism. Sooner or later, a genera-
tion will arise whose sense of tradition is weak enough that they will take 
Darwinism to its full conclusions, and in so doing, will radically alter the 
mission and purpose of our church.  
By contrast, those who hold to a biblical protology should have a ro-
bust theism capable of supporting the biblically defined mission of the 
church. God is sovereign. He rules and lays claims on us. A divine im-
perative impels us to labor for the salvation of souls and to call people to 
obedience to God’s commandments as an expression of their faith and 
submission. The biblical God designs, decides, and reveals His will to 
man. We have the privilege of calling people to renounce rebellion 
against God’s express will and surrender to God’s divine designs in mor-
als and lifestyle. Our mission, like Paul expressed to the Corinthians, is 
thus something that can reveal God’s power in ways that mere arguments 
cannot. Adherence to the Genesis doctrine of Salvation provides not only 
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the moral and theological foundations needed for mission, but a frame-
work for God to empower that mission. Belief in non-teleological theo-
ries of origins inherently emasculate the mission of the church from the 
biblical concepts needed to make it effective.  
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